We use investment-level data to study performance persistence in venture capital (VC). Consistent with prior studies, we find that each additional IPO among a VC firm's first ten investments predicts as much as an 8.5% higher IPO rate on its subsequent inves-tments, though this effect erodes with time. In exploring its sources, we document several additional facts: successful outcomes stem in large part from investing in the right places at the right times; VC firms do not persist in their ability to choose the right places and times; but early success does lead to investing more in later rounds and in larger syndicates. This pattern of results seems most consistent with the idea that initial success improves access to deal flow. That preferential access raises the quality of subsequent investments, perpetuating performance differences in initial investments.
I. Introduction
One of the more distinctive features of private equity as an asset class is long-term persistence in the relative performance of private equity partnerships. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) , for example, find correlations of nearly 0.5 between the returns of one fund and the next within a given private equity firm. Among venture capital (VC) funds, they report even higher levels of persistence, with correlations approaching 0.7 (see also, Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009; Robinson and Sensoy, 2013; Korteweg and Sørensen, 2017) . By contrast, persistence has been almost non-existent among asset managers operating in the public equity markets, such as mutual funds and hedge funds (for reviews, see Ferson, 2010; Wermers, 2011) . The most common interpretation of this persistence has been that private equity managers differ in their quality. Some managers, for example, may have a stronger ability to distinguish better investments from worse ones. Or, they may differ in the degrees to which they add value post-investment-for instance, by providing strategic advice to their portfolio companies or by helping them to recruit high-quality executives.
The inference of ability differences across private equity investors, however, has been indirect, in part because prior studies of persistence have been at the fund level.
1 Although that level of analysis has been appropriate for estimating the serial correlations in returns and understanding variance in investable performance, fund-level aggregation has some disadvantages for disentangling the sources of persistence. Persistence might, for example, occur simply because managers invest in particular regions and industries (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001 ). If those segments differ in terms of their positions in long-run cycles or in their levels of competition among private equity firms (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 2000) , then one could observe serial correlation due to inertia in the contexts in which firms invest rather than because some venture capitalists prove better than others at selecting, monitoring or advising their portfolio companies.
To gain greater insight into the sources of persistence, we therefore shift the unit of analysis to the individual investment. Doing so allows us to control for differences in the average performance of investments at particular points in time, and in particular industries and regions. It also allows us to examine persistence in performance across all investors and over an extended period of time as opposed to within the subset of firms and time periods for which fund-level returns are available.
We focus our analysis on the venture capital segment of private equity for two reasons.
First, it has exhibited the highest levels of persistence (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Harris et al., 2014) . Second, our shift in unit of analysis requires an investment-level performance measure. Although information on investment-level -as opposed to fund-level -returns has been available for select subsets of investors, one can determine for all startups whether they went public or were acquired. Since these forms of investment exits produce nearly all of the positive returns in venture capital (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Cochrane, 2005) , the rates of these events within a particular VC fund correlate highly with fund returns (Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009) .
Consistent with prior studies of returns at the fund-level, we find high levels of performance persistence at the investment-level across VCs. For example, a 10 percentage point higher IPO rate among a VC firm's first ten investments -that is, one additional IPOcorresponded to a more than 1.6 percentage point higher IPO rate for all subsequent investments by that firm, relative to a VC with one less IPO among its first 10 investments. Given that fewer than one in five investments in our sample resulted in an IPO, that amounts to an 8.5% higher likelihood of a public offering over the baseline.
State-industry-stage-year intercepts at the investment level absorb roughly half of this gross persistence. In other words, differences in where, when, and how venture capital firms invest account for much of the overall persistence in performance across VCs. But even among VC firms investing in the same stages in the same industries in the same states in the same years, a 10 percentage point higher IPO rate among a VC firm's first ten investments is correlated with a roughly 4.3% higher IPO rate for the firm's subsequent investments.
We find that the across-VC correlation in success rates attenuate over time. Some of the attenuation stems from attrition: VC firms with few IPOs or exits among their initial investments presumably find it difficult to raise a subsequent fund. However, long-term convergence nevertheless accounts for most of the attenuation. In fact, using a number of different estimation techniques, our investment-level results reveal that venture capital exhibits mean reversion, just as one finds in other asset classes.
But performance differences nevertheless persist for long periods of time, on the order of a decade or more. What might account for that persistence? Analyzing performance at the investment level allows us to document a number of additional facts that provide some insight into the probable source of the persistence. Initial success, for example, appears to stem in large part from investing in the right places at the right times. Indeed, our analyses reveal that the average IPO and exit rates for all investments made by other VC firms in the same state-industry-stage-year segments as the focal VC firm's initial investments strongly predict the observed success rates for the focal VC firm's initial investments. Initial success therefore stemmed not so much from idiosyncratic choices or from nurturing a set of companies but from investing in the right places at the right times.
Interestingly, initial success, itself, rather than some underlying characteristic of the VC firms appeared to account even for the apparent within-segment persistence. Regressions using the average rates of success among other VC firms as an instrument for a focal VC firm's initial success -thereby purging the focal VC firm's unobserved ability in choosing and cultivating specific investments from the estimates -generated as large estimates of persistence as the naïve linear regressions. Thus, while venture capitalists add value to startups through the provision of capital and through mentoring and monitoring (e.g., Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Bernstein et al., 2016) , differences across venture capitalists in their ability to select and add value to specific investments appear to play no discernible role in accounting for performance persistence.
VC firms may nevertheless differ in their ability to select investments based not on identifying specific promising startups but by spotting emerging trends and technologies. In other words, VC firms may vary in their aptitude for choosing attractive segments. We find, however, that VC firms exhibited little persistence in the selection of attractive segments.
In other words, VC firms that had invested initially in attractive industries and regions, which often continued to experience above-average exit rates for a period of time, were more successful when they continued to invest in those same places. When choosing industries and regions in which they had not previously invested, VC firms that had enjoyed initial success displayed no better ability to select the promising segments than those that did not.
But initial success does lead to changes in how venture capitalists invest. VC firms experiencing initial success invested more and in larger groups of investors. They became more central in the co-investment network, potentially allowing them to see a wider selection of deals. VC firms with higher levels of initial success also shifted their investments away from the first round of financing, where assessing the potential of a startup proves most difficult. Firms without access to syndication networks may need to focus more on initial rounds to "get into" promising startups, while those with access have the luxury of investing later, after some of the uncertainty surrounding the startup's prospects has been resolved.
Adjusting for these differences eliminated most of the remaining performance persistence within a particular region, industry, investment stage, and year.
This pattern of results appears most consistent with the access channel accounting for performance persistence in venture capital. One of the unusual aspects of the asset class is that venture capital operates to some extent as a two-sided market. Offering the best price or the first bid may not allow a venture capitalist to invest in a startup. Entrepreneurs also choose investors and venture capitalists choose syndicate partners. To the extent that entrepreneurs and other venture capitalists believe that VC firms differ in their ability to add value to firms, they prefer partners perceived as more able. Hsu (2004) , in fact, documents that entrepreneurs accept lower valuations and less attractive terms from more prestigious VC firms when choosing between offers. Prominent VC firms also gain access to a wider and better range of investment opportunities through syndicate partners who want to co-invest with them (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Hochberg et al., 2007) .
Despite their beliefs about the importance of these quality differences, entrepreneurs and other venture capitalists have little on which to base their assessments of VC firm quality.
Even ex post they cannot determine whether another VC firm might have generated more value for a particular venture. In such situations, initial differences in success -even due to chance events -could lead others to perceive a venture capitalist as higher quality, allowing that investor to access attractive deals. Even with no unusual ability to select investments or to nurture them to success, matching with more promising ventures improves the quality of a venture capitalist's realized deals, thereby perpetuating initial success.
Our results connect to several strands of the finance literature. Most directly, they advance the literature examining persistence in the performance of venture capital firms.
Our investment-level analyses suggest that initial success matters for the long-run success of VC firms, but that these differences attenuate over time and converge to a long-run average across all VCs. Although these early differences in performance appear to depend on being in the right place at the right time, they become self-reinforcing as entrepreneurs and others interpret them as evidence of differences in quality, giving successful VC firms preferential access to and terms in investments. This fact may help to explain why persistence has been documented in private equity but not among mutual funds or hedge funds, as firms investing in public debt and equities need not compete for access to deals. It may also explain why persistence among buyout funds has declined as that industry has become more competitive (Braun et al., 2017) .
Interestingly, even if persistence emerges from access advantages rather than from differences in ability, investors in the asset class -the limited partners -would still prefer to invest in the historically-successful firms, especially in terms of performance net of the industries, regions, and stages in which they invested. Persistence due to where venture capitalists invest might simply reflect differences in the underlying risks associated with the VC firms' portfolios, the betas. But preferential access to deal flow could not only raise the expected returns of funds but also reduce the uncertainty associated with them. Not surprisingly then, VC firms that have enjoyed success in their earlier funds raise larger funds and raise them more frequently (Gompers et al., 1998; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005 
II. Data
We analyze data drawn from the VentureXpert database maintained by Thomson Reuters, which includes round-level information on venture capital investments across the world. VentureXpert has unique investor-and portfolio company-identifiers that allow us to trace the outcomes of individual portfolio companies and to construct the entire investment histories of nearly all VC firms. Although no data source offers complete coverage of all venture investments, Kaplan and Lerner (2017) note that VentureXpert has better coverage than the primary alternatives at the level of individual investment rounds. Within this date range, we restrict our focus to firms headquartered in and investing in the United States. We also limit the analysis to firms involved in venture capital investing.
VentureXpert includes the entire spectrum of private equity firms, from early stage venture 2 Although VentureXpert under reports the proportion of companies that have failed (leaving them coded as ongoing concerns), this fact should not bias our results as we focus only on successful exits, through IPOs and through trade sales.
3 The first documented VC firm, American Research and Development Corporation, began investing in 1946. However, since most of the prominent players in venture capital emerged in the 1970s or later, this restriction does not exclude any of the elite firms.
investors to those engaged in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). As noted above, our focus on performance at the investment level requires an investment-level performance measure. For those engaged in venture capital investing, exits -whether through IPOs or through trade sales -provide a good measure of investment-level performance. But for firms engaged in other forms of investment, such as distressed debt and LBOs, these outcomes are less relevant. We therefore limit the sample (i) to VC firms classified as private partnerships, (ii) to funds classified as venture capital, and (iii) to investments in the four investment stages related to venture capital (seed, early, expansion, and later).
Because many follow-on investments -additional investments made by a VC firm in one of its existing portfolio companies -occur almost de facto if the target company has another investment round, we limit our analysis to the initial investments by particular VC firms in specific startup companies.
4 In other words, a portfolio company can appear in our sample multiple times, once for each VC firm that invested in it. Any given VC firm will also appear many times in our sample, once for each portfolio company in which it has invested. But, if a VC firm invests in the same portfolio company across multiple rounds, only the first investment by that firm -which might not represent the first round of investment in the portfolio company -appears in our sample. This restriction also prevents us from counting the same successful outcome more than once for any particular investor. By contrast, write-offs, the single most common outcome, generally resulted in a near total loss of the original investment. Given the bimodal nature of these outcomes, it has become common for researchers to treat IPOs and acquisitions (trade sales) as successful events and all other outcomes as unsuccessful (e.g., Cochrane, 2005; Hochberg et al., 2007) . Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) , moreover, demonstrated that the proportion of target companies that have a successful exit in a fund has a very high correlation to the ratio of distributed funds to funds paid in by the limited partners, a common measure of returns.
III. Persistence

A. Investment-Level Persistence
We begin by documenting persistence in the performance of venture capital investors at the investment level. Our approach involves assessing the strength of association between the success of a VC firm's prior investments to its success in subsequent investments. An alternative approach would treat performance persistence essentially as an invariant property of the firm, similar to a firm-specific alpha. Korteweg and Sørensen (2017) , for example, decompose performance persistence into that associated with the firm and that associated with the period of the investment. Their approach has advantages for estimating the signalto-noise ratio in fund performance (and consequently in the extent to which investors may have the ability to identify correctly better-performing firms). But that approach also has a couple of disadvantages with respect to our interests. First, it essentially assumes that firm-level advantages remain stable over time. Second, it effectively attributes all consistent firm-level differences to ability.
Our core estimation approach is a series of linear probability models with fixed effects:
where Y vi refers to the dichotomous outcome -either an IPO or any exit -of the investment made by VC firm v in the ith startup company in which it invested. We report these results in Table 2 . Our main variable of interest isȲ
, the share of VC firm v's ten investments prior to its investment in startup i that resulted in the outcome Y . Our choice of 10 investments is somewhat arbitrary, but our results are robust to using three, five, seven, or ten investments to measure success. in part because our sample covers a longer period, in part because the database has fewer missing values for target company exits than for fund returns. 9 Second, our focus on initial investments means that any differentials associated with some VC firms "doubling down" more effectively than others, or systematically being better at abandoning worse performing investments, would not appear in our estimates.
Even after adjusting for these fine-grained differences in kinds of investments, however, the proportion of IPOs (or exits) in the previous ten investments by a VC firm still correlate strongly with the success of that firm's subsequent investment.
Columns (3) and (4) repeat the estimations in Columns (1) and (2), but also add VCfirm fixed effects. Instead of comparing performance across firms, these regressions therefore examine how the prior success of a VC's prior 10 investments relate to the success of its subsequent investment. Interestingly, the coefficients now switch signs, implying that for any given VC, greater success in their prior 10 investments is associated with a lower likelihood of success in the subsequent investment. In other words, while we do measure persistence in the performance across VCs, we nevertheless also find evidence of mean-reversion in performance within VCs. We probe these results further in Tables 3-5 .
One implication of the results in Table 2 is that mean reversion exists, but that differences in the performance across VCs attenuates slowly over time. To test this more explicitly, we turn in Table 3 to looking at how the success of the initial 10 investments by a VC relate to performance differences in subsequent investments across VCs. We therefore re-run regression (1), but replace our key explanatory variable -the share of successful outcomes in the previous 10 investments -with the share of successful outcomes in the initial 10 investments.
Note that our key explanatory variable,Ȳ 10 v now remains constant for each investment by a given VC firm so we can no longer include VC fixed effects. However, this approach has the benefit of being able to study how differences in initial success relate to differences in the success of subsequent investments by VCs and to study the duration of persistence in a more transparent manner. Both these should help shed light on mean reversion VC.
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results from regressions that only include year fixed effects. The coefficients are statistically significant and economically meaningful. Panel A indicates that every additional IPO among the first ten investments -a 10 percentage point increase in the rate -corresponded to a 1.6 percentage point higher IPO rate among all subsequent investments, an 8.5% difference relative to the average IPO rate. Similarly, Panel B implies that every additional exit among the same ten investments predicted a 1.9
percentage point higher exit rate (a 3.6% difference relative to the average). Column (2) adds year×state×industry×stage fixed effects. Even after adjusting for these fine-grained differences in kinds of investments, however, the proportion of IPOs (or exits) in the first ten investments by a VC firm still correlates strongly with the success of that firm's subsequent investments. Column (2) of Panel A, for example, implies that every additional IPO among the first ten investments predicts a 0.8 percentage point higher IPO rate among all subsequent investments, a 4.2% increase over the average IPO rate.
B. Time Path of Persistence
Columns (3)- (5) of Table 3 investigate the duration of this persistence. Column (3) examines the 11th to the 30th investments made by a VC firm, Column (4) the 31st to the 60th investments, and Column (5) the 61st to the 100th investments. As with Column (2), all of the models incorporate state-industry-stage-year fixed effects. Panel A reports the results for IPOs only and Panel B for all exits. The estimates consistently reveal a decline with experience in the extent to which success in the first ten investments predicted success in subsequent investments. The point estimates suggest little, if any, persistence beyond the 60th investment.
Selection offers one potential explanation for this attenuation. In other words, perhaps those with less success in their initial investments found it difficult to raise subsequent funds and therefore left the sample. In Table 4 , we therefore re-estimate the results from Table 3 for the sub-sample of VCs with at least 31 investments. Comparing the results from Table   3 and 4 reveals that selection does account for some of the attenuation. The sample of VCs that survived long enough to make at least 31 investments exhibits slightly lower levels of persistence than the full sample. But even among this sample -which roughly corresponds to the top 25% of all VCs in the VentureXpert data, performance persistence is apparent in investments 11-30 and moreover, persistence falls by half or more from investments 11-30 to investments 61-100. Consistent with the results in Tables 2 and 3 , convergence therefore appears more important than selection to producing this result.
This convergence may reflect learning, where those with the worst performance improve.
Kempf et al. (2014), for example, found that learning-by-doing appears to occur even among mutual fund managers. Within the venture capital industry, Sørensen (2007) used the number of investments that a VC firm had made as a proxy for its quality and found positive associations between this experience and the rates at which portfolio companies had successful exits. With learning, initial success might stem from some venture capitalists having a head-start in their understanding of how to operate but less successful firms would eventually catch up if they survived long enough to improve their investing (Cong and Xiao, 2017) .
To assess this possibility, Table 5 reports estimates of the relationship between the cumulative (logged) number of investments made by a VC firm prior to a focal investment and the success of that investment, in terms of the probability of an IPO (Panel A) and the probability of exit (Panel B). In Column (1), both panels show positive relationships between cumulative investing experience and expected success. In Panel A, for example, a doubling in experience corresponds to a 0.4 percentage point increase in the rate of IPOs associated with future investments, a 2% rise over the base rate. To account for the effects of selection on the population of VC firms, the second column introduces VC firm fixed effects, which flips the sign of the coefficient: success rates appear to decline with experience. Note that this coefficient points to declining performance with experience, on average, across all VC firms.
Column (3) reports mixed models, where we allow each individual VC firm to have a different learning rate as well as a different base level of success. In other words, we allow these variables to have random coefficients. The base level of success refers to the intercept-that is, the expected performance for VC firms with no investing experience. It therefore effectively captures initial performance differences. In these mixed models, experience, on average, has an estimated coefficient close to zero. But it varies substantially across firms (see the standard deviation of the estimated experience coefficient), meaning that many VC firms do better with investing experience and many others do worse. Interestingly, the correlation between these estimated firm-specific learning coefficients and those of the firmspecific intercepts ranges from −0.88 to −0.95 across the various models, meaning that firms with the highest initial performance declined the most over time while those with the lowest initial performance improved the most.
Similar to the results in Tables 2-4 , this decline in performance for those who had high initial success and improvement in performance for those who had lower initial success points to a mean-reverting process. Figure 1 , in fact, reveals that mean reversion appears even in the unadjusted data. Each dot on this plot represents the entire history of one VC firm in our sample. The x-axis depicts the total number of startups that the VC firm backed during our sample period, while the y-axis reports the proportion of those startup companies that either had an IPO (upper panel) or any exit (lower panel). Apart from one or two outliers, the graph illustrates a pattern of strong convergence to the mean: the VC firms with the largest number of investments converged to the industry average success rate.
IV. Sources of Persistence
Despite the convergence in performance over time, VC firms that enjoyed higher initial success continued to see higher subsequent success until their 60th investment. Since the average fund has roughly fifteen portfolio companies, our results imply that the advantages of early success persist well into the third or fourth fund.
We explored three potential mechanisms that might account for this persistence. Selection: Venture capitalists spend a great deal of time screening and doing due diligence on potential investments, trying to understand which ones have the greatest potential for growth and profit. These efforts appear effective: Research, for example, has found that VCbacked firms patent at higher rates, operate more efficiently, grow faster, survive longer, and more commonly experience profitable exits than seemingly similar firms that did not receive venture capital financing (Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Engel and Keilbach, 2007; Chemmanur, 2010; Puri and Zarutskie, 2012) . Some of these differences may reflect value added by the venture capitalist but some of it likely stems from the effective selection of promising startups (Gompers et al., 2016) . VC firms, moreover, may vary in this selection ability.
Monitoring: A substantial body of research also suggests that VC firms add value postinvestment to their portfolio companies in a variety of ways. Hellmann and Puri (2002) , for example, found that companies that received investments from VC firms adopted more professional management practices closer to the time of founding. Bottazzi et al. (2008) reported that more active VC firms appeared to increase the odds of a successful exit more than less active ones. And Bernstein et al. (2016) further found that, when VC firms monitored and advised their portfolio companies more closely, those companies, in turn, went public at higher rates. Given the numerous ways in which VC firms can add value post-investment, it would not seem surprising if some VC firms proved better at these activities than others.
Access: A third factor involves preferential access to deal flow. Venture capitalists select portfolio companies but entrepreneurs then also actively choose their investors. The venture capitalists already invested in a startup also have substantial influence over who gets invited to invest in subsequent investment rounds for a promising prospect (Sorenson and Stuart, 2008) . When startups have multiple suitors, venture capitalists with better reputations therefore will more likely win a deal when they bid the same price. In fact, entrepreneurs often prefer them even when they offer a lower price (Hsu, 2004) . Presumably, the entrepreneurs and existing investors believe it in their own interest to bring prominent venture capitalists into the deal, either because they believe that these investors have acumen or connections that could increase the value of the startup or because they believe that their investment will signal to others the quality of the startup.
We investigate these mechanisms in three steps. We begin by exploring the extent to which target-specific differences in the ability, related either to the selection or nurturing of specific investments, appear to account for performance persistence. We then explore whether some VC firms appear better able to select the right industries, regions, or times to invest. Finally, we examine the relationship between initial success and a variety of variables measuring investment behavior that should relate to access to deal flow.
A. Target-Specific Persistence
Before delving into the additional analyses, we note that the patterns reported in Section III already suggest that differences in the ability to select specific startups or in the ability to mentor and monitor them to success may not matter much in producing performance persistence. The value of these activities should only accrue to the specific companies in which a venture capital firm actually invests. One might also expect these abilities either to remain relatively stable over time or perhaps to improve with experience. But none of those patterns play out in data. Where and when VC firms invest accounts for more than half of the overall persistence. Initial success predicts future success within segments better than recent success. And, rather than improving with experience, VC firms exhibit mean reversion like other financial intermediaries.
One of the difficulties inherent in trying to determine whether such differences in ability might account for performance persistence, however, stems from the fact that one cannot readily assess investor ability independently from their investments. In examining this possibility further, we therefore took an indirect approach, estimating the extent to which one could predict early success on the basis of the average success of other investors in the same sorts of investments, and whether that average success for a particular kind of investment, in turn, predicted persistence in investment success.
To see why this approach gives us insight into this question, note that if some venture capital firms simply have a better ability to choose more promising companies or to nurture them to successful outcomes, then they should succeed at higher rates than their peers investing in similar sorts of deals. On the other hand, if common sector specific factors were responsible for initial success, then the outcomes of peers investing in those sectors should be highly correlated with the outcome of the focal VC's initial investments. We therefore use the success of peers among a VC's initial 10 investments as the key explanatory variable in our regressions -in essence, focusing only on common sector-specific drivers of initial performance and removing the portion of initial success that stems from the focal VC firm's selection and governance of specific startups. Specifically, we create a variable that captures the outcome of other portfolio companies (not backed by the focal VC firm) which received investments at the same times and in the same places as the focal VC firm's initial 10 investments. We then estimated: Since, by definition, this variable excludes the outcome of the focal VC firm's investments, this variable captures the extent to which the initial success stemmed simply from being in the right place at the right time. We report the results of these models in Table 6A . The results in both Panel A and Panel B reveal a strong positive correlation between the success of the focal investment and the average success experienced by other VCs in the past. The magnitudes imply that a VC whose initial 10 investments were in a cell that had a 10% point higher IPO rate of other startups (not backed by that VC) had a 4% higher chance of an IPO for all its subsequent investments, after controlling for the fine-grained fixed effects of the year-state-industry-stage cell for each of its subsequent investments. Given that the magnitude is so close to that seen in Table 3 , our results imply that early success of VCs depends in large part on having been "in the right place at the right time"-that is, investing in industries and in regions that did particularly well in a given year. In addition, the fact that we have purged our key explanatory variable of the focal VC's initial performance suggests that "being in the right place at the right time", itself, rather than some underlying characteristic of the VC firms appeared to account even for the apparent within-segment persistence.
In Table 6B , we provide another version of this analysis, by reporting the results from instrumental variable regressions, where the key explanatory variable in Table 3 The first stages in both Panels of Table 6B reveal a strong positive partial correlation between the success of the focal investor and that of other VC firms who invested in the same fine-grained state-industry-stage-year segments, on the order of 0.5. 12 Interestingly, not only do the instrumented results for success also exhibit persistence but the estimated magnitude of the persistence is also higher in the IV regressions. The larger standard errors nevertheless mean that one cannot reject the null that the IV regression produces equivalent estimates of effect sizes. 13 The fact that the IV regression can account for all of the within-segment persistence suggests that initial success itself -due to investing initially in the right places at the right times -explains even the differences in subsequent success across VC firms within particular industries and regions.
In our IV strategy, the exclusion restriction requires that, after controlling for these stringent fixed effects η i ysjg , the average success of other portfolio companies in the same segments as the focal VC firm's initial investments does not influence the success of the focal VC firm's subsequent investments, except through the effect it had on the focal VC -say by giving the focal VC a better reputation which then allowed for better access. Since each of the 12 The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F -statistic (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) assesses the strength of the first stage. It has the benefit of being robust to non-i.i.d. errors and thus suitable for clustered standard errors (as used here). Across all of the regressions, this F -statistic has a value close to or higher than the benchmark of roughly 16 for the instrument to have sufficient strength to eliminate 90% of the bias in the naïve regressions (Stock and Yogo, 2005) . 13 The IV regression may also yield larger magnitude results because it reduces downward bias due to measurement error.
focal investments controls for fine grained fixed effects, we are able to automatically address most such concerns. Nevertheless, one may be concerned about some residual correlation that might arise, for example, between a set of high quality VCs all investing together in the same cells, in which case the success of other investments might also pick up this correlated, unobserved skill. Figure 2 explores the extent to which that result depends sensitively on the exclusion restriction. To determine whether a small-to-modest violation of this exclusion restriction would threaten this result, we implemented the "local-to-zero" (LTZ) approach, proposed by Conley et al. (2012) . In essence, the exclusion restriction assumes that the coefficient for the instrument in the second stage has a value of zero (γ = 0). The LTZ method relaxes this assumption by allowing one to treat γ as though it comes from a distribution (γ ∼ U (0, δ)).
To establish a range of values for δ, it seems reasonable to assume that the coefficient γ for the instrument in the second-stage regression should not exceed that obtained in the reduced form regression. In other words, adding the endogenous variable should not increase the coefficient of the instrument since the instrument, the endogenous variable, and the dependent variable all have positive pairwise correlations. Given that the coefficients for the instrument in the reduced form estimations range from 0.05 to 0.08 (see Table 6A ), we explore values for δ up to 0.10. Even at quite high values of δ -cases that would involve substantial violations of the exclusion restriction -the IV produced point estimates equal to or larger than the OLS estimates (the red dot-dash lines). This result therefore does not appear sensitive to potential violations of the exclusion restriction.
B. Segment Selection
The analysis above runs counter to the view that some VC firms have a systematically better ability to select specific companies or have more aptitude in nurturing them to success (although of course VCs in general play an important role in selecting and governing startups).
VC firms may still differ in their ability to select investments at a more macro level. Perhaps some venture capitalists can foresee the industries and regions about to emerge as hotspots.
If so, then being in the right place at the right time may depend not just on chance but also on the ability to see these emerging trends.
We explored this issue by examining whether VC firms exhibited persistence in choosing attractive segments. We measured the attractiveness of a state-industry-stage-year segment as above (in defining the instrumental variable); that is, for each investment, we calculated the attractiveness of the segment as the average IPO rate (or exit rate) experienced by all startup companies in the same state-industry-stage-year receiving an investment from another VC firm. We regressed this measure of segment attractiveness on the average segment attractiveness of the first ten investments in which the VC firm invested. We estimated: Table 7 reports the results of these models. Panel A treats only IPOs as a successful outcome while Panel B includes all exits. In Column (1), VC firms appear to exhibit some persistence in continuing to invest in attractive segments. That result, however, does not necessarily point to an ability to spot trends in those segments. It could simply reflect inertia in where venture capitalists invest combined with some serial correlation in the success rates of specific industries and regions.
The second and third columns, therefore, examine only cases in which the VC firm invested in state-industry-stages in which it had not invested in its first ten investments. VC firms appear far less able to spot trends in these "new" segments. The remaining persistence, moreover, appears to stem from the fact that all investors can easily spot some trends (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) . It took little special insight, for example, to understand that Internet-related businesses seemed a good place to invest in the late-1990s. After accounting for these observable characteristics signaling the attractiveness of the segment in the third column, the ability to choose attractive segments appears to fall to zero.
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C. Investing Behavior
We turn finally to examining preferential access to deal flow. The difficulty with examining this potential mechanism stems from the fact that our data do not allow us to see who had the opportunity to invest in a particular target company or who would have liked to have invested but who could not get into the deal. We therefore explored how the characteristics of later investments correlated with initial success, controlling for the characteristics of the initial investments. In other words, we examined how VC firms changed in their investing behavior in response to initial success.
We have one observation per later investment (i.e. the 11th and subsequent investments).
The dependent variables reflect the characteristics of those investments or of the VC firm at the time of that investment -round of the investment, the syndication of the investment, the amount of the investment, and the centrality of the focal VC firm in the syndication network -and the level of initial success enjoyed by the VC firm again serves as the primary explanatory variable of interest. We estimated:
where C vi refers to the characteristic of interest for VC firm v at the time of the investment in target company i,C v10 denotes the average value of the characteristic in question across 14 These models adjust for the popularity of the segment with eight measures: (i) the count of startup companies, in the segment, in which the focal VC firm did not invest; (ii) the average number of VC firms investing per round in these other startups; (iii) the average size, in 2015 dollars, of VC investments in them; (iv) the average eigenvector centrality of the VC firms investing in these other startups; (v) IPOs and (vi) acquisitions in the same state-industry segment among startup companies that received their last investment in the previous five years; and (vii) IPOs and (viii) acquisitions in the same industry among startup companies that received their last investment in the previous five years.
the first ten investments made by the VC firm v, and φ y represents fixed effects for the year of the investment. Table 8 first considers the probability of investing as part of a syndicate and the average size of those syndicates. Columns (1) and (2) examine whether the investment round involved more than one investor. Initial success appeared to lead to more syndicated investments.
Each additional initial exit corresponded to a 0.9 to 1 percentage point increase in the probability of syndication. Given the roughly 12% baseline probability of a solo investment, this effect amounts to a 7% to 8% decline in the probability of a solo investment for each initial exit. Columns (3) and (4) then explore whether initial success also corresponded to investing in larger syndicates. It did, with each additional initial exit predicting a roughly 4% increase in the number of co-investors in subsequent investment rounds. Columns (5) and (6) finally consider whether initial success led to firms becoming more central in the co-investment network.
15 These models reveal the largest correlates of initial success, with a 10 percentage point higher success rate among the initial five or ten investments predicting a 8% to 14% increase in centrality. We should note that all of these changes hold in models where we instrument initial success using the same instrument introduced in Table VI . These changes therefore appear to stem from initial success itself rather than from unobserved factors related to both early success and investing strategies. Table 9 considers the investment round and investment size of the VC's initial investments. As a startup matures, more information becomes available about its chances of success. Investors can therefore more easily discriminate the wheat from the chaff, the companies with the highest potential from the also-rans. Columns (1) and (2) consider only whether the first investment by the focal VC firm occurred in the first round of investing in the target company (by any venture investor). All of the models suggest that VC firms reduced the proportion of investments made in the first round in response to initial success.
Each additional initial exit predicted a 0.7 to 0.8 percentage point drop in the probability of a first round investment. Columns (3) and (4), then, consider whether initial success led to larger investments. 16 Initial success predicted larger future investments, with each additional initial exit corresponding to a 5.6% increase in the amount invested per participant in the syndicate.
17
But do these changes in investing behavior account for performance persistence? Table   10 examines the extent to which the positive long-term effects of performance associated with initial success depend on these mechanisms, by adjusting for them in our persistence models. Panel A reports the results for only IPOs while Panel B considers both IPOs and trade sales as successful forms of exit. Overall, these changes appear to account for 54% to 68% of the persistence remaining after adjusting for investing focus (i.e. including the YSIG fixed effects). Access to deal flow therefore would appear to explain most of the residual persistence in performance.
Some may feel that the finding of Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) that persistence appears, perhaps even more strongly, at the level of the individual venture capitalist conflicts with this interpretation. But prestige and social networks, and consequently access to deal flow, could easily exist at the level of individual partners. It would simply require that entrepreneurs or other venture capital firms prefer certain individuals within a firm to others-for example, that they might prefer John Doerr, or some other partner with a storied history, to an associate. It does, however, imply that some of the small residual persistence still observed in our sample may stem from individuals who develop reputations at existing firms but who then found their own investing partnerships.
16 VentureXpert only records the total amount invested in a round and the number of investors in the round but not how much each individual participant invested. We can therefore only estimate the average size of these investments.
17 This effect may, however, stem in part from more successful VC firms raising larger funds and therefore having more capital to deploy in future target companies.
V. Discussion
To understand better what channels might account for persistence in the performance of private equity firms, we examine how the performance of VC firms' investments -in terms of having successful exits, either through IPOs or trade sales -depend on their initial success.
Although the performance of VC firms converges with increasing numbers of investments, we find that initial success predicts future success for as many as 60 subsequent investments.
Initial success, moreover, has far more predictive power than more proximate success. We find that both initial and future success depend in large part on being in the right places at the right times but also that VC firms do not appear to persist in their ability to select those attractive segments. We further find that differences in the selection or nurturing of specific portfolio companies appears to contribute little to explaining this persistence. However, VC firms enjoying early success did shift their investments to later stages and to syndicated investments. Initial success also allowed these firms to move into more central positions in the co-investment network.
The picture that emerges then is one where initial success gives the firms enjoying it preferential access to deal flow. Both entrepreneurs and other VC firms want to partner with them. VC firms therefore get to see more deals, particularly in later stages, when it becomes easier to predict which companies might have successful outcomes. Even if venture capitalists do not differ in their abilities to identify more promising ventures (but they all have some ability to distinguish the entrepreneurs and startups with better odds of success), the access channel could perpetuate differences in initial success over an extended period of time.
Although our results suggest that VC firms do not differ in their relative ability to select and govern startups, they do not imply that VC firms do not create value on average. Our findings seem entirely consistent with the long literature documenting the many ways in which VC firms can increase the value of the firms in which they invest. We would also note that our analysis cannot say anything about whether ability or status might drive performance persistence on the intensive margin of returns. Some investors, for example, might become good at experimentation-investing in a large number of firms and doubling down or abandoning investments in a way that leads to better overall returns. This access channel would nevertheless help to explain why persistence appears in private equity but not in most other settings, such as mutual funds and hedge funds. For investors primarily purchasing and selling public securities, access depends only on price. When multiple firms perceive an opportunity they therefore compete away the returns associated with it. But, in venture capital, access often depends on more than price. It operates as a two-sided market. Because entrepreneurs and other investors believe that they might benefit from affiliating with prominent investors -who they believe have the ability to create more value for them -they willingly accept lower prices from these individuals and firms, allowing them to earn rents on their reputations.
Because this mechanism depends to some extent on the idea that the supply of capital exceeds the demand for it, at least for deals with less uncertainty, it also implies that the returns to status should become more pronounced during periods when venture capital becomes plentiful. Indeed, consistent with this expectation, Shi et al. (2017) , exploring the temporal sensitivity of the results in Hochberg et al. (2007) , found that VC firms central in the co-investment network only enjoyed higher success rates during booms. During busts, central fims appeared no different in their performance than less central ones.
Even though these differences do not emerge from heterogeneity in the abilities of VC firms, investors in venture capital, limited partners, can potentially still invest in them to earn excess returns. Whether they can do so, however, depends in large part on whether investors have enough information about the performance of previous funds at the time that they must decide whether to invest in future ones. Phalippou (2010) , for example, notes that a large share of the correlation in returns across funds stems from investments made within only a few years of one another, when the outcomes of the earlier ones would not necessarily have yet been realized. Our results, nevertheless, suggest that at least a small portion of the performance persistence associated with early success lasts long enough for investors to react to it.
Wermers, Russ, 2011, Performance measurement of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional accounts, Annual Review of Financial Economics 3, 537-574. Notes: This figure replicates the estimation of Table VI using the "local-to-zero" (LTZ) method of Conley et al. (2012) . The graph on the left corresponds to Panel B of Table VI Table 6a ). All estimations include Year x State x Industry x Stage fixed effects, noted below as YSIG. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
(1) (1) and (2) is an indicator for whether the initial investment by the focal VC was syndicated with another VC. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the log of the syndicate size in which the VC's first investment took place. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is the Eigenvector Centrality of the VC. Standard errors are clustered by VC firm and startup company. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
(1) (1) and (2) is an indicator for whether the initial investment by the focal VC was in Round 1 vs. later. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the log of the round size in which the VC's first investment took place. Standard errors are clustered by VC firm and startup company. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
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